

Discussion: Private Equity Debt Investors

Daniel Ruf

University of St.Gallen

2nd Annual Private Markets Research Conference, July 6, 2018

Summary

- ▶ Preferences of PE-affiliated CLOs for loans from firms sponsored by connected PE division (Own Debt Bias)
- ▶ Two explanations:
 - (1) funding support (or price pressure) channel
 - ▶ debt investments (funding) from PE-affiliated CLOs (primary loan market)
cost of borrowing $\downarrow \Rightarrow$ fund's equity returns \uparrow
 - (2) information spillovers
 - ▶ private information from PE to affiliated CLO \Rightarrow profitable trading in secondary loan market
- ▶ interesting and relevant topic
- ▶ very innovative research question
- ▶ robustness tests to address different perspectives

Summary

- ▶ How is the paper related to previous literature?
 - ▶ new implications on syndicated loans in private markets
 - ▶ benefits from funding channel and information spillovers
 - ▶ specific outcome for private markets?
 - ▶ maybe stronger contrast to syndicated loans in banking sector: underperformance of asset management divisions of commercial banks (conflict of interest?)
 - ▶ open door for future research: comparison in terms of systemic risk, inefficiencies, misallocation of resources, conflicts of interests...
 - ▶ results related to literature on conflict of interests
 - ⇒ apparently, no conflict of interest in private markets?

Some Possible Refinements

- ▶ Data
 - ▶ representativeness of CLO-i data over sample period
 - ▶ more representative over time, especially after 2008?
⇒ time trend?
 - ▶ sample split: before/after 2008?
- ▶ 6,333 affiliated trades out of 504,915 transactions ($< 2\%$)
 - ▶ affiliated trades increasing over time?
 - ▶ affiliated trades related to market size of PE companies?
- ▶ further explore cross-sectional differences in Own-Debt-Bias for affiliated CLO managers and relation to CLO/PE characteristics ⇒ mutual benefits (for PE and affiliated CLO) related to market size/market power of PE?

Some Possible Issues to Explore

- ▶ Costs of borrowing: spread over LIBOR/EURIBOR (market-based measure) and price discount
 - ⇒ further analyze cross-sectional variation of price discount
 - ▶ related to explanatory PE characteristics?
 - ▶ price discounts as adjustment mechanism to create forced price pressure on peer lenders?
- ▶ Role of credit supply constraints
 - ▶ interaction term between affiliated funding and borrower characteristics (e.g., credit risk) or additional funding investments from peers (demand pressure)
 - ▶ %-share of affiliated/non-affiliated funding?

Some Possible Issues to Explore

- ▶ Information Spillovers from PE to CLOs
⇒ private information or learning?
- ▶ Alternative Story:
CLO benefits from past experience about PE-affiliated trades in primary market ⇒ comparative advantage when purchasing comparable facilities in secondary market
 - ▶ placebo test with quasi-natural experiment?
 - ▶ if private information available, no advantage after change in affiliation ⇒ rule out learning

Thank you for your attention!